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675 
The Disability Dilemma: Difficulties Involving ERISA 
Claims for Subjective-Proof Diseases 
Introduction 
Imagine going to the doctor with an intense amount of pain. When he 
shows you the pain scale, you point to the most scrunched up, sweating 
face, indicating you’re feeling a ten on a ten-point scale.1 Imagine that your 
doctor tells you that you are not entitled to relief because he cannot 
objectively measure how much pain you are feeling. He cannot objectively 
find the cause of your pain, and so he cannot prescribe any medication that 
might help you manage that pain. Though this scenario would not happen in 
a doctor’s office, this process is how some disability plans treat employee 
claims for benefits under employee benefit plans covered by the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).
2
 Claimants want disability 
benefits for diseases that doctors diagnose using subjective criteria, such as 
patient reports of pain or interviews, but employers do not want to grant 
these benefits because of the lack of objective proof of the disease.  
Many claims for long-term disability benefits are denied, some because 
the subjective evidence the claimant presented, even by way of a treating 
physician, do not meet the criteria for which their plan provides.
3
 Since 
these claims are expensive to pay out, the employer may deny the claim 
early on, banking on the fact that the claimant may not want to expend the 
time and money to appeal the denial.
4
 In an obvious disability case, such as 
the result of a car accident, it may be easy to obtain disability benefits. If, 
on the other hand, “there is any dispute regarding a diagnosis or impairment 
and its disabling effects, the insurance company usually resolves that doubt 
                                                                                                             
 1. Wong-Baker FACES Pain Rating Scale, WONG-BAKER FACES FOUND., 
http://wongbakerfaces.org (last visited Jan. 17, 2020).  
 2. Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–
1461 (2012). “The terms ‘employee welfare benefit plan’ and ‘welfare plan’ mean any plan, 
fund, or program which was . . . established or maintained by an employer or by an 
employee organization . . . for the purpose of providing for its participants or their 
beneficiaries . . . disability . . . benefits . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).  
 3. See, e.g., Hobson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 574 F.3d 75, 88 (2d Cir. 2009); Billinger 
v. Bell Atl., 240 F. Supp. 2d 274, 282–83 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  
 4. See Loren M. Lambert, ERISA: License to Cheat, Lie, and Steal for the Disability 
Insurance Industry, UTAH B.J., Sept.-Oct. 2008 at 14, 16 (“[A] reasonably sophisticated and 
careful insurance company can summarily deny almost all appeals and immunize their 
decision from reversal in federal district court.”).  
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in its favor.”5 When a claim for disability is denied, it can be very difficult 
for a claimant to appeal the decision.
6
 A claimant must first file an 
administrative appeal and exhaust his administrative remedies.
7
 If the denial 
is affirmed, then the claimant must find a lawyer and appeal to the proper 
district court, creating an additional expense. Given the deferential standard 
of review for ERISA denials, it is likely that a district court will uphold the 
plan administrator’s decision.8 
When plan administrators deny these claims, claimants may appeal the 
denial to the federal court that has jurisdiction and venue over the claim.
9
 In 
most cases, the federal court will review the claim to determine if the plan 
administrator abused its discretion in denying the claim for disability 
benefits.
10
 The abuse of discretion standard of review—used in most 
appeals of denial of disability claims—provides that the administrative 
denials of the claims are usually upheld.
11
 
Frequently, employees make benefits claims for disabilities that stem 
from diseases that are diagnosed using subjective evidence.
12
 Plan 
                                                                                                             
 5. Id.  
 6. See id. (“[U]nder ERISA, regardless of the merits of a disability claim, to prevail a 
claimant must show that the insurance company’s decision was unreasonable, only 
supported by more than a scintilla of evidence, or both.”). 
 7. See, e.g., Counts v. Am. Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co., 111 F.3d 105, 108 (11th 
Cir. 1997); Weldon v. Kraft, Inc., 896 F.2d 793, 800 (3d Cir. 1990); Amato v. Bernard, 618 
F.2d 559, 567–68 (9th Cir. 1980).  
 8. See Lambert, supra note 4, at 16.  
 9. See infra Section II.A. 
 10. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 (1989); see also 
Christopher R. Stevenson, Abusing Abuse of Discretion: Judicial Review of ERISA 
Fiduciaries’ Discretionary Decisions in Denial of Benefits Cases, 27 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. 
L.J. 105, 106 (2009) (“Circuit courts erroneously imported the overly-deferential arbitrary 
and capricious standard of review into ERISA, making it unlikely for any but the most 
blatantly unreasonable administrator’s decisions to be overturned.”). 
 11. See Stevenson, supra note 10, at 106 (“Despite Congress’s good intentions, 
employees whose ERISA health claims had been denied still faced an uphill battle in federal 
court.”).  
 12. See, e.g., Hawkins v. First Union Corp. Long-Term Disability Plan, 326 F.3d 914, 
916 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[F]ibromyalgia, ‘also known as fibrositis [is] a common, but elusive 
and mysterious, disease, much like chronic fatigue syndrome, with which it shares a number 
of features. Its cause or causes are unknown, there is no cure, and, of greatest importance to 
disability law, its symptoms are entirely subjective.’”) (quoting Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 
305, 306–07 (7th Cir. 1996)); Rodriguez v. McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 2d 676, 
677 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“The issue . . . is whether the malady known as ‘fibromyalgia’ is 
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administrators have denied long-term disability benefits because they deem 
the evidence for disability too subjective, therefore finding the claimant is 
not disabled.
13
 Administrators also include provisions in their contracts that 
prevent long-term disability coverage for diseases that involve certain “self-
reported” symptoms.14  
The standard of review in a judicial appeal for a denial of long-term 
disability benefits under ERISA in its current state does not allow a 
claimant full and fair review, especially if the claimant suffers from a 
subjective-proof disease. The medical perplexity involved in the etiology of 
these diseases and the discretion given to plan administrators under these 
claims make it very difficult for a claimant to overturn a denial of these 
benefits. This Comment examines the policy implications of the bias 
against subjective evidence as it is paired with the generous abuse of 
discretion standard of review implemented in most denial of disability 
benefits cases.  
Part I of this Comment outlines the pathway of benefits claims under 
ERISA and the road to federal court review of administrative decisions. 
Part II discusses subjective-proof diseases and the types of evidence that 
claimants bring forward in their attempts to obtain disability benefits. Part 
III provides an overview of certain proof requirements in both ERISA 
litigation and other areas of the law and analyzes how courts are handling 
administrative denials for disability claims involving subjective proof. 
Finally, Part IV suggests reforms to ensure protections for claimants who 
apply for disability benefits for diseases and conditions that are only 
diagnosable using subjective proof.  
  
                                                                                                             
medically determinable, notwithstanding the absence of a definitive objective test for its 
diagnosis.”).  
 13. See, e.g., Schnoor v. Walgreen Income Prot. Plan for Pharmacists & Registered 
Nurses, 968 F. Supp. 2d 869, 873 (W.D. Mich. 2013).  
 14. See, e.g., Chronister v. Baptist Health, 442 F.3d 648, 655 (8th Cir. 2006) (evaluating 
a provision limiting disability benefits to twenty-four months if based on self-reported 
symptoms, in this case fibromyalgia); Hilton v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 967 F. Supp. 
2d 1114, 1116, 1120 (E.D. Va. 2013) (evaluating a provision limiting disability coverage to 
twenty-four months in the case of self-reported migraine headache symptoms).  
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I. The Disability Claims Process 
A. The Cause of Action 
In 1974, Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) to implement a uniform set of rules and protections for 
employees.
15
 Before its enactment, pension and other employee benefit plan 
claims disputes were resolved as breaches of contract.
16
 The impetus for 
ERISA was the “rapid and substantial” increase in the “size, scope, and 
numbers of employee benefit plans.”17 The primary goal of ERISA was to 
“protect interstate commerce and the interests of participants in employee 
benefit plans and their beneficiaries.”18  
ERISA provides regulation for employer-provided welfare plans.
19
 
Under ERISA, a welfare plan is a “plan, fund, or program” created or 
managed by an employer “for the purpose of providing” medical benefits to 
its participants “in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death, or 
unemployment.”20 ERISA defines disability as “the inability to work for 
pay because of an injury or illness.”21 In a 2018 survey, the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics found that 34% of workers had access to employer-
provided long-term disability insurance coverage, and that 97% of workers 
who had access to an employer-sponsored plan participated in it.
22
 
Many employers provide their employees with certain disability benefits, 
which are covered by ERISA.
23
 Disability benefits can be either short-term 
or long-term and include “payments, usually monthly, to replace income 
                                                                                                             
 15. See Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2012)).  
 16. See Mark D. DeBofsky, A Critical Appraisal of the Current State of ERISA Civil 
Procedure – An Examination of How Courts Treat “Civil Actions” Brought Under the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 18 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 203, 205 (2014). 
 17. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a).  
 18. Id. § 1001(b). 
 19. STEVEN J. SACHER ET AL., ABA SECTION OF LABOR & EMP’T LAW, EMPLOYEE 
BENEFITS LAW 26 (2d ed. 2000). 
 20. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)) (emphasis added).  
 21. Thomas Brown & Howard Hensley, Disability Benefit Plans, in EMPLOYEE 
BENEFITS HANDBOOK 18-2 (Fred K. Foulkes ed., 1982). 
 22. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, NATIONAL 
COMPENSATION SURVEY: EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES tbl. 16 (Mar. 2018), 
https://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2018/employee-benefits-in-the-united-states-march-
2018.pdf. 
 23. See id. at tbl. 2.  
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lost due to inability to work as a result of illness, injury, or disease.”24 
Long-term Disability (LTD) insurance is a policy that protects an employee 
from loss of income if he can no longer perform his job.
25
 LTD benefits 
begin paying out once short-term disability benefits have ended, typically 
after three to five months.
26
 Employers typically provide LTD plans for 
their employees as part of their compensation package (i.e., as fringe 
benefits), but they are not required to do so.
27
 Though short-term disability 
benefits generally expire within two years, long-term disability plans “pay 
extended benefits, generally until retirement age[].”28 Since they apply for 
an extended period, “LTD benefits are frequently payable only if the 
participant is unable to perform significant functions of any occupation for 
which he or she is reasonably suited by skill, education, and experience.”29 
LTD plans entail a large portion of disability claims because “[t]he 
present value of such claims can be substantial.”30 The high value of these 
claims is due to the potentially large payout if a claimant is young or highly 
compensated, because the benefits will typically be awarded until the 
claimant reaches retirement age.
31
 Most employer-sponsored LTD plans 
pay a fixed percentage of annual earnings to a worker awarded benefits.
32
 
According to the U.S. Department of Labor March 2018 survey, the median 
fixed percent of annual earnings is 60%.
33
 The same survey showed that 
88% of claimants awarded LTD benefits received the maximum benefit 
amount, with the ninetieth percentile receiving $15,000 per month.
34
  
To obtain LTD benefits from his employer-provided plan, an employee 
must show that he meets the disability requirements provided by his 
                                                                                                             
 24. SACHER ET AL., supra note 19, at 358. 
 25. 1 PAUL J. ROUTH, WELFARE BENEFITS GUIDE § 2:28 (2019).  
 26. Id.  
 27. BALDWIN’S OHIO HANDBOOK SERIES: EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES LAW § 14:1 (Nov. 
2019).  
 28. SACHER ET AL., supra note 19, at 358. 
 29. Id. at 358–59 n.17; see also Brown & Hensley, supra note 21, at 18-2 (“[M]ost 
long-term disability benefits are reserved for those who are unable to hold any substantial 
employment for which they are qualified.”). 
 30. SACHER ET AL., supra note 19, at 1087.  
 31. Id.  
 32. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 22, at tbl. 29.  
 33. Id. at tbl. 30.  
 34. Id. at tbl. 31. 
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employer’s plan.35 A participant files a claim with her plan administrator 
for benefits in accordance with plan procedures.
36
 After a claim has been 
made, ERISA directs that plan administrators must “(1) provide adequate 
notice in writing to any participant or beneficiary whose claim for benefits 
under the plan has been denied . . ., and (2) afford a reasonable opportunity 
to any participant . . . for a full and fair review by the appropriate named 
fiduciary of the decision denying the claim.”37 Though not expressly 
required under ERISA, federal courts have held that a claimant must 
exhaust her administrative remedies before filing suit.
38
  
Under ERISA, plan administrators act as fiduciaries
39
 because they 
exercise discretionary authority, control, or responsibility respecting both 
management and administration of employee welfare plans.
40
 As a 
fiduciary, plan administrators have specific duties under ERISA:  
 
A fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan 
solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries 
and – (A) for the exclusive purpose of: (i) providing 
benefits to participants and beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying 
reasonable expenses of administering the plan[.]
41
 
 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act provides for a private 
right of action for participants or beneficiaries “to recover benefits due to 
him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of 
the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of 
the plan.”42 These plans include “employee welfare benefit plans” which 
encompass those plans that are “established or maintained by an employer 
or by an employee organization . . . for the purpose of providing for its 
                                                                                                             
 35. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 108–09 (2008) (finding that 
claimant had to show a stricter standard—that she could not perform “‘the material duties of 
any gainful occupation for which’ she was ‘reasonably qualified’”).  
 36. ERISA mandates internal appeal procedures. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(b) (2018).  
 37. 29 U.S.C. § 1133(1)–(2) (2012). 
 38. See, e.g., Counts v. Am. Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co., 111 F.3d 105, 108 (11th 
Cir. 1997); Weldon v. Kraft, Inc., 896 F.2d 793, 800 (3d Cir. 1990); Amato v. Bernard, 618 
F.2d 559, 567–68 (9th Cir. 1980).  
 39. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14)(a) (“[A]ny fiduciary (including, but not limited to, any 
administrator . . . .”)). 
 40. Id. § 1002(21)(A).  
 41. Id. § 1104(a)(1).  
 42. Id. § 1132(a)(1)(B).  
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participants . . . medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in 
the event of sickness, accident, [or] disability.”43 When a claimant appeals 
the denial of an LTD benefit to the district court, he is exercising his right 
to a private action under ERISA. 
B. Standard of Review 
Though lengthy and elaborate, ERISA does not set forth a standard of 
review for appeals of claim denials.
44
 Before the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, federal courts imported the 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard found in the Labor Management 
Relations Act (LMRA) to claims under ERISA.
45
 Under this standard, if a 
plan administrator is found to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously in 
denying a claim for benefits, then that denial is overturned on appeal.
46
 In 
Firestone, the Court refused to import the entirety of LMRA’s “arbitrary 
and capricious” standard to ERISA, and attempted to provide guidance for 
federal courts as to how to review appeals for denial of benefits.
47
 
The Court determined that the correct standard of review analysis would 
be found in trust law, as “ERISA abounds with the language and 
terminology of trust law.”48 The Court noted that “[t]rust principles make a 
deferential standard of review appropriate when a trustee exercises 
discretionary powers.”49 For example, plan administrators exercise 
                                                                                                             
 43. Id. § 1002(1).  
 44. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 (1989) (“ERISA does not 
set out the appropriate standard of review for actions under § 1132(a)(1)(B) challenging 
benefit eligibility determinations.”). 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Beam v. Int’l Org. of Masters, Mates, & Pilots, 511 F.2d 975, 979 (2d Cir. 
1975); see also Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Emps.’ Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1052 (7th 
Cir. 1987) (describing arbitrary and capricious standard as imported from the FMLA) 
(“[W]hen a plan provision as interpreted had the effect of denying an application for benefits 
unreasonably, or, as it came to be said, arbitrarily and capriciously, courts would hold that 
the plan as ‘structured’ was not for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees, so that 
the denial of benefits violated [§ 186(c)].”).  
 47. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 109–10.  
 48. Id. at 111. “In determining the appropriate standard of review for actions under § 
1132(a)(1)(B), we are guided by principles of trust law.” Id. at 110 (citing Central States, Se. 
& Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transport, Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985)).  
 49. Id. at 111 (noting that “[w]here discretion is conferred upon the trustee with respect 
to the exercise of a power, its exercise is not subject to control by the court except to prevent 
an abuse by the trustee of his discretion”) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS: 
CONTROL OF DISCRETIONARY POWERS § 187 (AM. LAW INST. 1959)).  
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discretionary powers when a plan grants them authority to determine if a 
claimant is entitled to benefits.
50
 The favorable standard of review toward 
fiduciaries and trustees comes from the idea that “a court of equity will not 
interfere to control [trustees] in the exercise of a discretion vested in them 
by the instrument under which they act.”51 The plan at issue in Firestone 
did not have a provision granting the plan administrator discretionary 
authority, but the Court determined that such a clause would lead to the 
more deferential standard of review.
52
 And now, almost all plans have such 
a clause.
53
 
The Restatement (Second) of Trusts lists six factors to consider when 
determining whether a fiduciary has abused his discretion: 
(1) the extent of the discretion conferred upon the trustee by the 
terms of the trust; (2) the purposes of the trust; (3) the nature of 
the power; (4) the existence or non-existence, the definiteness or 
indefiniteness, of an external standard by which the 
reasonableness of the trustee’s conduct can be judged; (5) the 
motives of the trustee in exercising or refraining from exercising 
the power; [and] (6) the existence or nonexistence of an interest 
in the trustee conflicting with that of the beneficiaries.
54
  
                                                                                                             
 50. Id. at 113.  
 51. Id. at 111 (quoting Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 724–25 (1875)).  
 52. Id. at 111, 115.  
 53. See Peter A. Meyers, Discretionary Language, Conflicts of Interest, and Standard of 
Review for ERISA Disability Plans, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 925, 927 (2005) (“In most 
circuits, however, evidence of abusive practices will not come to light; so long as the plan 
document explicitly gives the fiduciary discretion to make benefit determinations . . . .”); 
see, e.g., Hancock v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 590 F.3d 1141, 1146 (10th Cir. 2009) (providing 
an example of a reservation-of-discretion clause in an ERISA plan) (“Benefits under this 
plan will be paid only if (the plan administrator) decides in its discretion that (the claimant) 
is entitled to them. (The plan administrator) also has discretion to determine eligibility for 
benefits and to interpret the terms and conditions of the benefit plan.”) (quoting Utah 
Insurance Rule 590-218-5(3)).  
 54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS: CONTROL OF DISCRETIONARY POWERS § 187 
cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1959). Though Supreme Court case law references the Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts in its evaluation of ERISA appeals, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts was 
published in 2005. The principles of abuse of discretion review remain unchanged. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: JUDICIAL CONTROL OF DISCRETIONARY POWERS § 87 cmt. 
d (AM. LAW INST. 2007). 
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For purposes of ERISA review, “the most important [factor] is the presence 
of any conflicts of interest on the part of the plan fiduciary.”55 
Although the Supreme Court instructed courts to contemplate a plan 
administrator’s conflict of interest in reviewing ERISA appeals, the lack of 
instruction led to circuits developing differing approaches.
56
 One method, 
the “sliding scale” approach, was adopted by the Third, Fourth, Seventh, 
and Tenth Circuits.
57
 Other approaches adopted by the circuit courts 
involved shifting the burden to the plan administrator to prove that the 
decision was not an abuse of discretion when a conflict of interest existed, 
or simply continuing to use the standards similar to the arbitrary and 
capricious review promulgated pre-Firestone.
58
  
Though drawing from trust law for the proper standard, the Court in 
“Firestone likely flipped the presumption of trust law, which traditionally 
assumes deference unless the trust says otherwise.”59 The Court held “that a 
denial of benefits challenged under [ERISA] is to be reviewed under a de 
novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary 
discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe 
the terms of the plan.”60 Under a de novo standard of review, a court 
“decid[es] the issues without reference to any legal conclusion or 
assumption made by the previous court to hear the case.”61 If the plan does 
grant the plan administrator authority to determine eligibility, then the court 
reviews the decision to determine if the plan administrator abused his 
discretion in denying benefits to the claimant.
62
 Though the Fifth Circuit 
had held that the de novo standard of review espoused in Firestone was 
limited to the construing of plan terms,
63
 in Ariana v. Humana Health Plan 
of Texas, Inc., it joined with the rest of the circuits in applying de novo 
                                                                                                             
 55. Stevenson, supra note 10, at 114.  
 56. Ryan M. LoRusso, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Glenn: Will the 
Supreme Court Decision Reduce Confusion after Firestone?, 17 CONN. INS. L.J. 189, 197 
(2010).  
 57. Id. at 199. 
 58. Id. at 197–200; see also Stevenson, supra note 10, at 115–30 (providing a 
breakdown of each circuit’s approach).  
 59. Ariana M. v. Humana Health Plan of Tex., Inc., 884 F.3d 246, 253 (5th Cir. 2018) 
(footnote omitted) (citing Ramsey v. Hercules Inc., 77 F.3d 199, 203–05 (7th Cir. 1996)).  
 60. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).  
 61. DeNovo, LEGAL INFO. INST. (July 2017), https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/de_novo.  
 62. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115.  
 63. See Pierre v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co./Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 932 F.2d 1552, 
1561–62 (5th Cir. 1991).  
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review in all cases where the plan does not grant discretion.
64
 Though a step 
in the right direction, the fact is that most plans will grant discretionary 
authority to plan administrators.  
When determining whether a plan administrator has abused its discretion 
under ERISA, courts will typically look at whether there is substantial 
evidence to support the administrator’s finding,65 or whether the decision 
was arbitrary.
66
 The Seventh Circuit, for example, has held that the abuse of 
discretion standard and the arbitrary and capricious standard are 
synonymous.
67
 The Eighth Circuit has held that “if an administrator’s 
decision ‘is extraordinarily imprudent or extremely unreasonable, the court 
is likely to find that there has been an abuse of discretion.’”68 
Circuit courts evaluate for an abuse of discretion under differing 
factors.
69
 When addressing the issue of a plan administrator’s conflict of 
interest, the Supreme Court iterated that under the law of trusts, “if a benefit 
plan gives discretion to an administrator or fiduciary who is operating under 
a conflict of interest, that conflict must be weighed as a ‘facto[r] in 
determining whether there is an abuse of discretion.’”70 Thus, when an 
“insurer acts as both funding source and administrator,” courts will consider 
that conflict in their evaluation and adjust the leniency of the standard.
71
  
                                                                                                             
 64. Ariana, 884 F.3d at 250–53.  
 65. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan, 468 F.3d 
1082, 1085 (8th Cir. 2006) (“To be reasonable [under the abuse of discretion standard], the 
decision must be supported by substantial evidence.”) (citing Norris v. Citibank, N.A. 
Disability Plan (501), 308 F.3d 880, 883–84 (8th Cir. 2002)). 
 66. Keller v. AT&T Disability Income Plan, 664 F. Supp. 2d 689, 699–700 (W.D. Tex. 
2009) (“An abuse of discretion exists if the administrator’s factual determinations are 
arbitrary and are not supported by substantial evidence.”) (citing Meditrust Fin. Servs. Corp. 
v. Sterling Chem., 168 F.3d 211, 215 (5th Cir. 1999)).  
 67. Holmstrom v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 615 F.3d 758, 767 n.7 (7th Cir. 2010).  
 68. Goewert v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 442 F. Supp. 2d 724, 727 (E.D. Mo. 
2006) (quoting Cox v. Mid-Am. Dairymen, Inc., 965 F.2d 569, 572 (8th Cir. 1992)).  
 69. See Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Judicial Review of Denial of Disability Benefits 
Under Employee Benefit Plan Governed by Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(1)(B) – Fiduciary Conflict of Interest–Post-Firestone Cases, 
18 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 607, § 4 (2007) (compiling cases where circuit courts take fiduciary 
discretion into account).  
 70. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS: CONTROL OF DISCRETIONARY POWERS § 187 cmt. d 
(AM. LAW INST. 1959)).  
 71. See Salomaa v. Honda Long Term Disability Plan, 642 F.3d 666, 674 (9th Cir. 
2011) (citing Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 965 (9th Cir. 2006)).  
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In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Glenn, the Supreme Court 
attempted to clarify how reviewing courts should take into account plan 
administrators’ conflict of interest.72 The Court reiterated that plan 
administrators hold conflicting interests because they “both determine[] 
whether an employee is eligible for benefits and pay[] benefits out of [their] 
own pocket[s].”73 In Glenn, the claimant was diagnosed with dilated 
cardiopathy, which presents through symptoms of “fatigue and shortness of 
breath.”74 She applied through her employer plan provider, MetLife, for 
disability benefits and was granted short-term disability for a term of 
twenty-four months.
75
 MetLife then directed her to pursue a claim for 
Social Security Benefits, which MetLife could use to offset the amount they 
were paying out on the plan.
76
 An administrative law court granted Glenn 
the Social Security benefits, as it “found that Glenn’s illness prevented 
her . . . ‘from performing any jobs [for which she could qualify] existing in 
significant numbers in the national economy.’”77 
To continue receiving disability payments from MetLife, Glenn had to 
show “that her medical condition rendered her incapable of performing . . . 
‘the material duties of any gainful occupation for which’ she was 
‘reasonably qualified.’”78 MetLife denied long-term disability benefits, and 
Glenn brought a federal suit in response.
79
 The district court upheld the 
denial of benefits, and Glenn appealed to the Sixth Circuit.
80
 The Sixth 
Circuit reviewed the denial under a deferential standard and treated the plan 
administrator’s conflict of interest as a relevant factor, as MetLife both 
decided whether an employee was entitled to benefits and paid out those 
benefits.
81
 
The Court of Appeals set aside the denial for a variety of reasons,
82
 and 
MetLife petitioned for certiorari to determine whether it acted under a 
                                                                                                             
 72. 554 U.S. 105, 112–19 (2008).  
 73. Id. at 108. 
 74. Id. at 109.  
 75. Id.  
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. (quoting the petition for certiorari). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 110.  
 82. The Sixth Circuit set aside the denial of benefits because  
(1) the conflict of interest; (2) MetLife’s failure to reconcile its own conclusion 
that Glenn could work in other jobs with the Social Security Administration’s 
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conflict of interest.
83
 The Solicitor General requested in an amicus curiae 
brief that the Court provide guidance on how these conflicts of interest 
should be treated and weighed on appeal.
84
 The Court addressed both of 
these questions, in turn, in an attempt to bridge the divide between circuit 
courts in their interpretation of the holding in Firestone.
85
 
In interpreting Firestone’s use of administrative conflict of interest as a 
factor in evaluating ERISA determinations, the Court elaborated that this 
weighing does not change the standard of review from abuse of discretion 
to de novo review.
86
 The Court refused to overturn Firestone and 
implement universal de novo review because it believed that Congress did 
not intend for such judicial oversight of plan administration.
87
 The Court 
also noted that “[b]enefits decisions arise in too many contexts, concern too 
many circumstances, and can relate in too many different ways to 
conflicts . . . for us to come up with a one-size-fits-all procedural system 
that is likely to promote fair and accurate review.”88 The Court went on to 
approve the Sixth Circuit’s “combination-of-factors method of review,” in 
which the court weighs many different fact-specific factors, including a 
conflict of interest, in coming to its decision.
89
  
The Court noted that its “elucidation of Firestone’s standard d[id] not 
consist of a detailed set of instructions.”90 The Court avoided providing a 
set procedural and reviewing process because of “the impalpable factors 
involved in judicial review.”91 In his concurrence in part, Chief Justice John 
Roberts disagreed with the majority’s treatment of a plan administrator’s 
                                                                                                             
conclusion that she could not; (3) MetLife’s focus upon one treating physician 
report suggesting that Glenn could work in other jobs at the expense of other, 
more detailed treating physician reports indicating that she could not; (4) 
MetLife’s failure to provide all of the treating physician reports to its own hired 
experts; and (5) MetLife’s failure to take account of evidence indicating that 
stress aggravated Glenn’s condition. 
Id. (citing Glenn v. MetLife, 461 F.3d 660, 674 (6th Cir. 2006)).  
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. (citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 22, 
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008) (No. 06-923)). 
 85. Id. at 112–19.  
 86. Id. at 115 (“We do not believe that Firestone’s statement implies a change in the 
standard of review, say, from deferential to de novo review.”).  
 87. Id. at 116. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 118.  
 90. Id. at 119.  
 91. Id. (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)).  
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conflict of interest as a factor motivating more exacting scrutiny by the 
reviewing court.
92
 He wrote that the majority’s focus on “the mere 
existence of a conflict” tempts courts to substitute their discretion in place 
of the plan administrator’s.93 He continued, “This problem is exacerbated 
because the majority is so imprecise about how the existence of a conflict 
should be treated in a reviewing court’s analysis.”94 
Even after the decision in Glenn, circuit courts have interpreted the 
holding in Firestone differently.
95
 Many circuits that had used the “sliding-
scale” test in formulating the standard of review rejected that approach.96 
This rebuff stems from the appellate court determination that Glenn 
instructed courts to “take the conflict into account not in formulating the 
standard of review, but in determining whether the administrator or 
fiduciary abused its discretion[.]”97 Contrastingly, the Tenth Circuit has 
reconciled the Supreme Court’s decision in Glenn with the “sliding-scale” 
approach.
98
 The Tenth Circuit ruled that it “dial[ed] back” deference if the 
plan administrator operated under a conflict of interest.
99
 Thus, the Tenth 
Circuit still applies an arbitrary and capricious standard, but “decreas[es] 
the level of deference given . . . in proportion to the seriousness of the 
conflict.”100 
Though Supreme Court jurisprudence allows deference when a 
discretionary clause is present, many states have attempted to ensure 
claimant rights by outlawing the enforcement of discretionary clauses.
101
 
State legislatures are trying to protect the claimant, but they are not always 
successful because of ERISA’s preemption of state law.102 ERISA 
“supersede[s] any and all State laws insofar as they may . . . relate to any 
                                                                                                             
 92. Id. at 121 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  
 93. Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  
 94. Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  
 95. See Stevenson, supra note 10, at 114–32.  
 96. Id. at 134 (citing Estate of Schwing v. Lilly Health Plan, 562 F.3d 522, 525 (3d Cir. 
2009); Champion v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 550 F.3d 353, 358–59 (4th Cir. 2008)). 
 97. Estate of Schwing, 562 F.3d at 525.  
 98. Weber v. GE Grp. Life Assurance Co., 541 F.3d 1002, 1010 (10th Cir. 2008).  
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. (quoting Flinders v. Workforce Stabilization Plan of Phillips Petroleum Co., 491 
F.3d 1180, 1190 (10th Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008)).  
 101. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 10110.6 (West 2019), invalidated by Williby v. Aetna 
Life Ins. Co., 867 F.3d 1129 (9th Cir. 2017).  
 102. See, e.g., Williby, 867 F.3d at 1136–37.  
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employee benefit plan” ERISA covers.103 For example, in Williby v. Aetna 
Life Insurance Co., the Ninth Circuit found that California’s statute 
outlawing the enforcement of discretionary clauses did not apply to an 
ERISA short-term disability plan.
104
 In this case, the district court reviewed 
Aetna’s denial of short-term disability under a de novo standard, finding 
that Aetna improperly denied Williby’s claim.105 On appeal, the Ninth 
Circuit reversed and remanded “for reconsideration under the proper 
standard of review,” i.e., abuse of discretion.106 
Contrarily, the Seventh Circuit held that ERISA does not preempt an 
Illinois regulation prohibiting discretionary clauses in health and disability 
insurance policies.
107
 The Illinois insurance regulation explained: 
No policy, contract, certificate, endorsement, rider application or 
agreement offered or issued in this State, by a health carrier, to 
provide, deliver, arrange for, pay for or reimburse any of the 
costs of health care services or of a disability may contain a 
provision purporting to reserve discretion to the health carrier to 
interpret the terms of the contract, or to provide standards of 
interpretation or review that are inconsistent with the laws of this 
State.
108
 
In Fontaine v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., MetLife argued that 
ERISA preempted the Illinois regulation, and the court’s review should be 
under an arbitrary and capricious standard.
109
 The Seventh Circuit rejected 
that argument, finding that the Illinois regulation was applicable because it 
fell under an exception to ERISA preemption that saves state laws “which 
regulate[] insurance.”110 By allowing the application of the Illinois 
regulation, the Seventh Circuit ensured that the Illinois state legislature’s 
attempt to protect claimant interests was effectuated.
111
 
  
                                                                                                             
 103. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012).  
 104. See Williby, 867 F.3d at 1137.  
 105. Id. at 1131.  
 106. Id. 
 107. Fontaine v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 800 F.3d 883, 886–87 (7th Cir. 2015).  
 108. Id. at 886 (quoting 50 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 50, § 2001.3 (2002)).  
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A)).  
 111. With the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Fontaine, it joined the Sixth Circuit in 
allowing application of state laws prohibiting discretionary clauses. Id.; see Am. Council of 
Life Insurers v. Ross, 558 F.3d 600, 607 (6th Cir. 2009).  
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II. Putting Fibromyalgia in the Patient Chair to Understand Subjective-
Proof Diseases 
Doctors diagnose many diseases today based on subjective reports.
112
 
These subjective reports might include complaints of pain, suicidal 
thoughts, and reports of extreme emotions, such as those that may lead to 
the diagnosis of a phobia.
113
 For example, agoraphobia, or the fear of 
people, does not have an objective medical test.
114
 A doctor does not test a 
vial of blood or perform an MRI to determine if a patient has an intense fear 
of crowds or strangers. Diagnosis of phobias occurs purely through an in-
depth interview with the patient and an evaluation of medical, psychiatric, 
and familial histories.
115
 The diagnosis for diseases such as General Anxiety 
Disorder is similar.
116
 The doctor relies on the reports of the patient to 
determine a diagnosis, even if this disease would not typically be treated 
with medicine but with a form of psychotherapy.
117
 
This Comment uses the term “subjective-proof” disease to refer to a 
disease for which there is no objective medical test to determine the 
diagnosis. An objective medical test would include measures such as an x-
ray, which would clearly show a broken bone, or an MRI, which would 
show a tumor in an organ. For example, fibromyalgia is a subjective-proof 
disease because there is no viable objective medical test. Since “no 
underlying measurable or pathophysiological causes have been 
confirmed[,]” the condition is rendered “incompatible with 
medical/scientific models that emphasize measurable criteria.”118 
Fibromyalgia is one subjective-proof disease that is common in disability 
                                                                                                             
 112. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 688–89 (4th ed. 2000) (discussing subjectivity of diagnosing personality 
disorders).  
 113. See id.  
 114. Id. at 432–33.  
 115. Specific Phobias, MAYO CLINIC (Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.mayoclinic.org/ 
diseases-conditions/specific-phobias/diagnosis-treatment/drc-20355162. 
 116. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 112, at 476 (indicating that diagnosis of 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder includes association with three of the following six 
symptoms: “(1) restlessness or feeling keyed up or on edge[;] (2) being easily fatigued[;] (3) 
difficulty concentrating or mind going blank[;] (4) irritability[;] (5) muscle tension[;] (6) 
sleep disturbance (difficulty falling or staying asleep, or restless unsatisfying sleep)”).  
 117. See Specific Phobias, supra note 115 (“The best treatment for specific phobias is a 
form of psychotherapy called exposure therapy.”). 
 118. Sean M. Hayes et al., Fibromyalgia and the Therapeutic Relationship: Where 
Uncertainty Meets Attitude, 15 PAIN RES. & MGMT. 385, 386 (2010). 
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appeals, but it is far from the only disease in which diagnosis is based on 
subjective evidence. Other subjective-proof diseases include chronic fatigue 
syndrome, schizophrenia, mental illnesses, and phobias.
119
 Classifying a 
diagnosis as a subjective-proof disease renders the disease incompatible 
with claims for long-term disability benefits and complicates the analysis 
for appellate courts. Some plan administrators have argued that diseases 
such as fibromyalgia are not “medically determinable,” and therefore 
claimants cannot show entitlement to disability benefits.
120
  
To examine the issues involved in appeals of denials of disability claims 
for subjective-proof diseases, this Comment will use fibromyalgia as its 
principal example. “Fibromyalgia is a disorder characterized by widespread 
musculoskeletal pain accompanied by fatigue, sleep, memory and mood 
issues.”121 Fibromyalgia is frequently litigated in disability appeals because 
of its subjective nature.
122
 An employee with fibromyalgia might pursue a 
disability claim because the pain is so great that she cannot work.
123
 There 
is evidence that “fibromyalgia involves differences in the processing of 
pain, particularly in the processing of sensory input and painful stimuli.”124 
The Mayo Clinic notes that “[d]octors don’t know what causes 
fibromyalgia, but it most likely involves a variety of factors working 
together.”125 The factors listed include genetics, infections, and physical or 
emotional trauma.
126
 
                                                                                                             
 119. See Salomaa v. Honda Long Term Disability Plan, 642 F.3d 666, 677–78 (9th Cir. 
2011) (“There are no specific diagnostic studies (i.e., laboratory, radiography, 
psychosomatic or other testing) or physical findings that are specific to the diagnosis of 
[chronic fatigue syndrome].”) (quoting the Center for Disease Control criteria) (emphasis 
removed); see also AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 112, at 688. 
 120. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 2d 676, 677–78 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).  
 121. Fibromyalgia, MAYO CLINIC (Aug. 11, 2017), https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-
conditions/fibromyalgia/symptoms-causes/syc-20354780. 
 122. See, e.g., Johnson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 437 F.3d 809, 812 (8th Cir. 2006); 
Hawkins v. First Union Corp. Long-Term Disability Plan, 326 F.3d 914, 916 (7th Cir. 2003).  
 123. See, e.g., Huffaker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 271 F. App’x 493, 501 (6th Cir. 2008); 
Billinger v. Bell Atl., 240 F. Supp. 2d 274, 281, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  
 124. Hayes et al., supra note 118, at 386 (citations omitted). 
 125. Fibromyalgia, supra note 121. 
 126. Id.; see Hayes et al., supra note 118, at 386 (“A genetic basis for the syndrome has 
also been explored.”).  
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The methods of diagnosis for fibromyalgia have changed over the 
years.
127
 One test frequently mentioned in cases evaluating a denial for 
disability benefits is the “tender-points test.”128 The tender-points test 
involves a physician pressing on certain points on a patient’s body and 
determining the amount of pain felt by the patient through subjective 
responses.
129
 Criticism of the “semi-objective” tender-points test alleges 
that “cervical tender points were almost impossible to assess” and “[w]hen 
physicians began the tender point examination, the patient’s interview had 
already provided clues as to what the examination results might be.”130 
Instead of an objectively diagnosable disease, “[f]ibromyalgia diagnosis 
often depended on physician referral, behavioral and emotional 
characteristics of patients, and the skill, interest, and beliefs of the 
physicians.”131 
In recent years, the medical community has developed new ways to 
diagnose fibromyalgia.
132
 In 2010, the American College of Rheumatology 
developed new fibromyalgia criteria “that excluded tender points, but 
included a count of pain locations and the physician’s rating of the most 
discriminative symptoms.”133 While the test’s criteria is not absolutely 
objective, about 50% of the criteria were accounted for with 
musculoskeletal pain, whereas “the other 50% came from fatigue, sleep, 
cognitive problems, and an estimate of the overall degree of somatic 
symptom severity.”134 These new diagnostic tools are still criticized, as “[i]t 
seems certain that physicians will differ in their conscientiousness in 
making such assessments and their interpretation of the severity of patient 
complaints.”135 
                                                                                                             
 127. Frederick Wolfe et al., What Is Fibromyalgia, How Is It Diagnosed, and What Does 
It Really Mean?, 66 ARTHRITIS CARE & RES. 969, 969–70 (2014).  
 128. Id. at 969; see, e.g., Rogers v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 238 (6th Cir. 
2007); Small v. Astrue, 840 F. Supp. 2d 458, 460–61 (D. Mass. 2012).  
 129. See Brown v. Barnhart, 182 F. App’x 771, 773 n.1 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Clinical signs 
and symptoms supporting a diagnosis of fibromyalgia under the American College of 
Rheumatology Guidelines include ‘primarily widespread pain in all four quadrants of the 
body and at least 11 of the 18 specified tender points on the body.’”) (quoting Green-
Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 2003)).  
 130. Wolfe et al., supra note 127, at 969.  
 131. Id.  
 132. See id.  
 133. Id.  
 134. Id.  
 135. Id.  
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Doctors within the medical community have differing attitudes towards 
fibromyalgia.
136
 There is still debate as to “whether fibromyalgia is a 
credible diagnosis at all.”137 In one survey, doctors and medical students 
ranked fibromyalgia “among the lowest in credibility of conditions.”138 In a 
study analyzing physician and specialist attitudes toward fibromyalgia, 
researchers found that “[a] total of 35% of [general practitioners] lacked 
confidence in using the American College of Rheumatology (ACR) 
criteria.”139 In the same study, only “[t]wo-thirds of participants . . . 
characterized fibromyalgia as diagnosable” though most who did so 
“commented on the subjectivity of the assessment.”140 Researchers 
presented a generalized view of fibromyalgia: 
In summary, fibromyalgia is characterized by undefined 
pathophysiology, uncertainty about diagnostic criteria, lack of 
knowledge regarding effective and safe treatments, and the need 
for a broad range of support and intervention that physicians are 
ill equipped to provide. These factors combine to create a 
climate of mismatched perceptions and unmet needs on the parts 
of both patients and physicians in the treatment of 
fibromyalgia.
141
  
The attitudes and medical processes involved in diagnosing diseases 
such as fibromyalgia produce difficulty when courts evaluate appeals from 
disability denials. This unease is true for both long-term disability claims 
and Social Security benefits claims. The Tenth Circuit has noted that 
“[w]hat makes fibromyalgia difficult to analyze . . . is the lack of objective 
symptoms[.]”142 In an appeal from a denial of Social Security benefits, the 
Tenth Circuit held that an administrative law judge’s failure to accord 
severe-impairment status to the claimant’s diagnosed fibromyalgia was 
reversible error.
143
 
                                                                                                             
 136. See Hayes et al., supra note 118, at 385.  
 137. Id. at 386 (citation omitted).  
 138. Id.  
 139. Id. at 387.  
 140. Id. (“It’s very subjective, so this is just based on a faith in patients saying [. . .] ‘It 
hurts; my [. . .] is sore.’ But you don’t have a measure of how much you can press the 
[tender] point.”) (quoting a general practitioner from the study).  
 141. Id. at 389.  
 142. Brown v. Barnhart, 182 F. App’x 771, 773 n.1 (10th Cir. 2006).  
 143. Id. at 773.  
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Though fibromyalgia and other subjective-proof diseases produce 
difficulty for both the medical and legal communities, scientists are 
conducting studies to measure pain objectively.
144
 Instead of using a “10-
point scale” or “emoji-style charts” that convey different levels of pain 
through facial expression, scientists aim to measure pain using “brain scans, 
pupil reactions and other possible markers of pain.”145 As one researcher 
puts bluntly, “If we can’t measure pain, we can’t fix it.”146 Though 
incomplete, this research could potentially ease the burden of claimants 
attempting to obtain disability benefits, as it would provide objective 
evidence of their disease. It is unclear how long until any of these research 
efforts may provide usable results.
147
 
III. The Legal Landscape 
A. The Objective Evidence Requirement 
Fibromyalgia muddles a court’s evaluation, as “[t]he subjective and 
inherently self-reported nature of fibromyalgia’s primary symptoms of pain 
and fatigue complicate disability benefit decisions and the review of benefit 
denials.”148 While recognizing that fibromyalgia’s “cause or causes are 
unknown” and “there is no cure,”149 courts have still found that “the 
physical limitations imposed by the symptoms of such illnesses do lend 
themselves to objective analysis.”150  
While there may be some requirement for objective evidence of the 
limitations fibromyalgia may impose on a claimant, some “[c]ourts have 
held that it is prima facie unreasonable to require claimants to submit 
objective evidence of the etiology of the disease, given that there are no 
recognized objective laboratory tests.”151 Although it may be impossible to 
                                                                                                             
 144. Lauran Neergaard, No Stethoscope for Pain: Scientists Seek Real Way to Measure, 
AP NEWS (Jan. 10, 2019), https://apnews.com/c75e6a1185024a7c8892dacf56e6e308.  
 145. Id.  
 146. Id. (quoting pediatric anesthesiologist at Children’s National Medical Center in 
Washington, Dr. Julia Finkel). 
 147. See id.  
 148. Adams v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. Civ.A. H-04-2179, 2005 WL 2030840, 
at *31 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2005).  
 149. Jordan v. Northrop Grumman Corp. Welfare Benefit Plan, 370 F.3d 869, 872 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (citing Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 855 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
 150. Boardman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 337 F.3d 9, 16–17 n.5 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 151. Adams, 2005 WL 2030840, at *32 (citing Mitchell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 113 F.3d 
433 (3d Cir. 1997); Cook v. Liberty Life Assurance Co., 320 F.3d 11, 21–22 (1st Cir. 2003); 
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have objective proof of the disease itself, “courts have recognized that an 
insurer may insist on objective proof and measures of symptoms and of 
limits on the ability to work, even when, as with fibromyalgia, diagnosis is 
difficult and subjective complaints such as ‘fatigue’ or ‘pain’ are the 
signature of the disease.”152 
Objective evidence of disability that stems from a subjectively 
diagnosable disease may come from tests such as Functional Capacity 
Evaluations (FCEs), home assessments, occupational therapy appraisals, 
independent medical examinations, and ADL (Aids to Daily Living).
153
 
These tests give doctors an idea of the mobility and strength that a claimant 
may be able to exert during a workday.
154
 If a claimant can perform some of 
the ADL, “then she is disabled partially; if she can’t do most of them she is 
severely disabled.”155 In Liebel v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., the claimant 
presented multiple doctors’ evaluations, an FCE, a home assessment, and 
an Independent Medical Evaluation (IME).
156
 During the FCE, “while Ms. 
                                                                                                             
Hawkins v. First Union Corp. Long-Term Disability Plan, 326 F.3d 914, 919 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(Posner, J.); Friedrich v. Intel Corp., 181 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 1999); Burchill v. 
UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 327 F. Supp. 2d 41, 51 (D. Me. 2004); Pralutsky v. Metro. Life 
Ins. Co., 316 F. Supp. 2d 840, 852–53 (D. Minn. 2004); Maronde v. Sumco USA Grp. Long-
Term Disability Plan, 322 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1139 (D. Or. 2004); Sansevera v. E.I. DuPont 
de Nemours & Co., 859 F. Supp. 106, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)).  
 152. Id. (citing Friedrich, 181 F.3d at 1112; Boardman, 337 F.3d at 16–17 & n.5). 
 153. See generally Liebel v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 595 F. App’x 755, 759–61 (10th Cir. 
2014); Welch v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 00-1439-DWB, 2007 WL 4374219 (D. 
Kan. Dec. 13, 2007), vacated by Welch v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 649 F. Supp. 2d 
1220 (D. Kan. 2009). “A functional capacity evaluation (FCE) evaluates an individual’s 
capacity to perform work activities related to his or her participation in employment.” 
Functional Capacity Evaluation, AM. OCCUPATIONAL THERAPY ASS’N, INC., 
https://www.aota.org/About-Occupational-Therapy/Professionals/WI/Capacity-Eval.aspx 
(last visited Dec. 19, 2019) (citing Remko Soer et al., Towards Consensus in Operational 
Definitions in Functional Capacity Evaluation: A Delphi Survey, 18 J. OCCUPATIONAL 
REHABILITATION 389 (2008)). The evaluation procedure “compares the individual’s health 
status, and body functions and structures to the demands of the job and the work 
environment.” Id. An ADL assessment involves observing or evaluating a claimant’s ability 
to perform daily living activities, including for example, “(a) bathing, (b) continence, (c) 
dressing/grooming, (d) eating, (e) mobility, (f) toileting, and (g) transferring (i.e., ability to 
move from one place to another, including bed to chair and back, and into and out of a 
vehicle).” Merie B. ex rel. Brayden O. v. Neb. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 863 
N.W.2d 171, 178 (Neb. 2015).  
 154. See Liebel, 595 F. App’x at 757–61.  
 155. Welch, 2007 WL 4374219, at *9 (emphasis removed). 
 156. Liebel, 595 F. App’x at 759–61.  
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Liebel complained of pain during the evaluation, ‘[p]hysiological responses 
(heart rate and respiratory rate) did not correlate with [her] subjective 
complaints of severe pain.’”157 Although Ms. Liebel had diagnoses of 
fibromyalgia, radiculopathy, failed back syndrome, narcotic use, and 
complained of pain, the court upheld the administrator’s decision to deny 
benefits.
158
 The court based its denial on the results of the functional 
evaluations and the evaluating doctors’ determinations that the claimant’s 
diseases did not render her unable to work at a sedentary level.
159
 
Courts have found it reasonable to weigh a claimant’s credibility when 
most of the evidence given to support a claim for disability is subjective.
160
 
These courts’ evaluation weighs more than just formal reports of motion 
and mobility, allowing the consideration of surveillance footage of the 
claimant when assessing the insurer’s denial.161 If subjective complaints of 
pain do not match with the surveillance footage, a court will likely uphold a 
denial for benefits.  
In Rizzi v. Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Co., the plan participant 
claimed disability because of “extreme pain and not being able to use [her] 
right extremities properly” and a diagnosis of Myofascial Pain 
Syndrome.
162
 The plan administrator initially granted Rizzi disability 
benefits, but Hartford conducted a follow-up evaluation three months after 
approval to check her condition.
163
 After this interview, in which Rizzi 
stated “her average pain level was an 8-10 on a scale of 1 to 10,” Hartford 
began surveilling Rizzi.
164
 Hartford observed Rizzi driving, bending at a 
ninety-degree angle, and clasping various items; she displayed no evidence 
                                                                                                             
 157. Id. at 759 (quoting the report).  
 158. Id. at 764–65.  
 159. Id.  
 160. See Meraou v. Williams Co. Long Term Disability Plan, 221 F. App’x 696, 705–06 
(10th Cir. 2007).  
 161. Plan administrators may covertly surveil claimants to observe mobility or activity. 
The Tenth Circuit has “implicitly endorsed using surveillance footage to document abuse of 
total disability benefits.” Courtney Bru, Big Brother’s Watching—And He Can Fire You, 
Too, Okla. Emp. L. Letter, Apr. 2007, at 5 (vol. 15, no. 4); see also Jerel C. Dawson, 
Subjective Tension: The Conundrum of Self-Reported Symptoms, DRI for Def., Sept. 2008. 
at 70 (vol. 50, no. 9) (“Video surveillance[] . . . is a cost-effective and under-utilized tool 
that can assist insurers and courts by furnishing objective documentation of disparities 
between a claimant’s subjectively reported limitations and his or her actual capabilities.”).  
 162. 383 F. App’x 738, 741 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting appellant’s application). 
 163. Id. at 742.  
 164. Id. at 742–43. 
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of pain.
165
 Hartford then terminated Rizzi’s disability benefits.166 Rizzi 
appealed her denial of benefits, alleging that “Hartford’s denial of benefits 
was arbitrary and capricious because of its . . . reliance on surveillance 
evidence[] [and] disregard of her subjective complaints of pain[,]” among 
other stated reasons.
167
 One of the evaluating doctors found that “the lack of 
objective medical evidence coupled with the surveillance evidence raised 
questions concerning Rizzi’s probity when self-reporting the level of her 
pain and functionality of her right arm.”168 This determination was 
especially relevant because “no other treating physicians documented any 
physical symptoms (like muscle atrophy, hair loss or nail discoloration) 
associated with an inability to mobilize or use her extremities.”169  
Other courts have held that disability benefits denials may be arbitrary 
and capricious when an evaluating physician disregards a claimant’s 
subjective complaints of pain.
170
 The Ninth Circuit found in Salomaa v. 
Honda Long Term Disability Plan that a denial based solely on the lack of 
objective evidence was an abuse of discretion.
171
 The court applied the 
abuse of discretion standard instead of de novo review because the plan 
“expressly and unambiguously g[ave] the administrator discretion to 
determine eligibility.”172 The claimant was diagnosed with “chronic fatigue 
syndrome,” which is diagnosed “by exclusion of other underlying 
diseases.”173 The reviewing court found the denial to be an abuse of 
discretion because “the plan administrator demanded objective tests to 
establish the existence of a condition for which there are no objective 
tests.”174 The plan administrators also refused to conduct their own physical 
                                                                                                             
 165. Id. at 743.  
 166. Id. at 745.  
 167. Id. at 747.  
 168. Id.  
 169. Id. at 753.  
 170. See Cruz-Baca v. Edison Int’l Long Term Disability Plan, 708 F. App’x 313, 315 
(9th Cir. 2017) (“It was arbitrary and capricious for Dr. Ramachandran Srinivasan to fail to 
discuss and consider Cruz-Baca’s subjective complaints of pain as evidence of her chronic 
pain syndrome.”).  
 171. 642 F.3d 666, 680–81 (9th Cir. 2011).  
 172. Id. at 673; see also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 
(1989).  
 173. Salomaa, 642 F.3d at 678 (quoting the Center for Disease Control criteria) 
(emphasis removed).  
 174. Id. at 676.  
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evaluations of the claimant and only paid medical professionals to review 
Salomaa’s file.175  
Although courts have found it unreasonable to require claimants to show 
objective evidence regarding the diagnosis of a disease such as 
fibromyalgia, it is not unreasonable to require objective evidence of the 
disability that renders the claimant unable to work. When the evidence does 
not show that the symptoms of fibromyalgia or a similar disease prevent the 
claimant from completing the actions of a normal workday or even the 
actions of a modified normal workday to accommodate a sedentary level of 
activity, a court will not typically overturn an insurer’s denial of a claim.  
Commonly, when a covered employee makes a claim for disability under 
ERISA, he simultaneously makes a claim for disability under the Social 
Security Act, and many private long-term disability plans encourage 
claimants to also file for Social Security benefits.
176
 Under the Social 
Security Act, there is a “treating physician rule” that requires administrative 
law judges to accord “special weight . . . [to the] opinions of the claimant’s 
treating physician.”177 The Ninth Circuit attempted to attach this rule to 
review of ERISA plans, but the Supreme Court overturned this 
determination in Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord.
178
 The Supreme 
Court refused to bring the “treating physician rule” over to ERISA claims 
because “[n]othing in the Act itself . . . suggests that plan administrators 
must accord special deference to the opinions of treating physicians” and 
ERISA does not “impose a heightened burden of explanation on 
administrators when they reject a treating physician’s opinion.”179 
Therefore, treating physicians are given less deference under ERISA claims 
than those for Social Security, though many involve the same disability. It 
falls upon the Secretary of Labor to adopt a treating physician rule for 
ERISA claims.
180
 Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in Black & Decker, writing for 
a unanimous Court, suggests that the Court would be deferential to, and 
likely uphold, such adoption of the rule by the Secretary of Labor. 
                                                                                                             
 175. Id.  
 176. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 109 (2008) (“MetLife . . . directed 
Glenn to a law firm that would assist her in applying for federal Social Security disability 
benefits . . . .”).  
 177. See Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 825 (2003) (citing 20 
C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2) (2002)).  
 178. Id.  
 179. Id. at 831.  
 180. See id.  
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When a claimant is denied, he must exhaust his administrative remedies, 
then may appeal the decision to the appropriate district court, and then on to 
the appropriate appellate court.
181
 When appealing a denial of disability 
benefits, the district court is generally limited to reviewing the 
administrative record.
182
 This limited scope is not how most district court 
cases are resolved—consistent with the normal application of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure in a civil action.
183
 There is no discovery, and the 
district court does not hear new evidence in an appeal for denial of 
disability benefits: 
[J]udicial review is confined to the administrative record before 
the ERISA plan administrator, and, thus, the district court sits 
more as an appellate tribunal than as a trial court, in that it does 
not take evidence, but, rather, evaluates the reasonableness of an 
administrative determination in light of the record compiled 
before the plan fiduciary.
184
 
This review of the “administrative record” is analogous to the type of 
review found in administrative proceedings.
185
 In an administrative 
proceeding, adjudicatory power lies with an administrative law judge or a 
publicly appointed official.
186
 For example, in a claim for Social Security 
benefits, “[t]he Commissioner of Social Security is directed to make 
findings of fact, and decisions as to the rights of any individual applying for 
a payment under [the Social Security Act].”187 In an ERISA benefits 
proceeding, adjudicatory power lies “in the hands of plan administrators, 
                                                                                                             
 181. See supra Section I.A.  
 182. See DeBofsky, supra note 16, at 204.  
 183. See id.  
 184. Wooster, supra note 69, § 8.  
 185. See Roy F. Harmon III, The Debate over Deference in the ERISA Setting – Judicial 
Review of Decisions by Conflicted Fiduciaries, 54 S.D. L. REV. 1, 1 (2009). Harmon argues 
that the Supreme Court’s decision in MetLife further aligns administrative law principles 
with administrative proceedings:  
Though framed in terms of trust law, the standard of review applied in most 
ERISA cases is essentially the same as that applied when federal courts review 
administrative agency actions. In both contexts, the standard of review can 
afford broad discretion to decision-makers and suppress inquiries, and thereby 
disputes, regarding matters outside the administrative record. 
Id. 
 186. See 28 C.F.R. § 68.28 (2019).  
 187. 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (2012).  
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who may frequently have a vested interest in the proceedings.”188 Though 
claimants are still allowed a civil action, claimant advocates argue that 
“[w]ith a judicial process that denies claimants a full opportunity to 
challenge the basis for adverse claim decisions, the civil action authorized 
by section 502 of ERISA is often rendered meaningless.”189 
B. Language of the Insurance Plan  
Courts have looked to the language of the insurance plan to determine if 
a denial of benefits is arbitrary or capricious. In an opinion that was later 
vacated due to a settlement, the United States District Court for Kansas 
analyzed the requirements of a policy’s “self-report clause” in relation to a 
claim for disability based on a diagnosis of fibromyalgia.
190
 Though 
vacated, the opinion provides relevant analysis of the interaction of 
fibromyalgia claims with plan terms that require objective evidence or limit 
availability of benefits for self-reported symptoms. The district court sought 
to determine whether the plan administrator’s denial of the claim for 
benefits due to fibromyalgia was arbitrary and capricious due to the 
application of the plan’s self-reported symptoms limitation.191  
The applicable provision of the plan “limit[ed] disability payments to a 
period of 24 months for ‘[d]isabilities, due to sickness or injury, which are 
primarily based on self-reported symptoms.”192 The plan defined self-
reported symptoms as “the manifestations of your condition which you tell 
your doctor, that are not verifiable using tests, procedures or clinical 
examinations standardly accepted in the practice of medicine.”193 The court 
maintained that to limit benefits on the question of “whether Ms. Welch’s 
fibromyalgia itself was diagnosed primarily on self-reported symptoms . . . 
[the insurer] would have acted arbitrarily and capriciously.”194 But since 
UNUM, the plan administrator, “based its denial on whether Ms. Welch’s 
                                                                                                             
 188. Harmon, supra note 185, at 3.  
 189. DeBofsky, supra note 16, at 214.  
 190. Welch v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 00-1439-DWB, 2007 WL 4374219, at 
*1 (D. Kan. Dec. 13, 2007), vacated by Welch v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 649 F. Supp. 
2d 1220 (D. Kan. 2009). 
 191. Id. (quoting Welch v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 382 F.3d 1078, 1082 (10th Cir. 
2004)). 
 192. Id. at *3 (quoting the language of the policy).  
 193. Id. (quoting the language of the policy). The plan also listed examples of self-
reported symptoms that included “headaches, pain, fatigue, stiffness, soreness, ringing in 
ears, dizziness, numbness and loss of energy.” Id. (quoting the language of the policy). 
 194. Id. at *5.  
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claimed disability was based on self-reported symptoms that could not be 
verified by tests or procedures,” the court found the provision 
enforceable.
195
  
In distinguishing the case at bar, the district court noted that “cases 
where courts have concluded that it was an abuse of discretion to require 
objective evidence of fibromyalgia (or other similar diseases such as 
chronic fatigue syndrome) have generally involved factual situations where 
the plan itself contained no self-report provision.”196 Conversely, the court 
found that UNUM had incorrectly applied the self-report clause to Welch’s 
fibromyalgia symptoms.
197
 The court reasoned that UNUM improperly 
“disregard[ed] the caveat that even self-reported symptoms such as pain 
may fall outside of the plan definition where there are tests, procedures or 
clinical examinations standardly accepted in the practice of medicine that 
would verify the severity of the patient’s reported pain.”198 The availability 
of clinical examinations and other verification procedures took the 
claimant’s fibromyalgia outside of this self-report provision.  
In Meraou v. Williams Co. Long Term Disability Plan, the court affirmed 
an insurer’s denial of benefits because the claimant “fail[ed] to show that 
the Committee’s decision, based on her failure to submit recent, 
comprehensive medical evidence sufficient to establish the disabling nature 
of her fibromyalgia, was arbitrary and capricious.”199 The plan in question 
provided that “‘Total Disability’ means . . . the inability of [the] Participant, 
based upon conclusive medical evidence, to engage in any gainful 
occupation for which he or she is reasonably fitted by education, training or 
experience, as determined by the Plan Administrator.”200 The court found 
that the claimant “fail[ed] to show that it was unreasonable for the 
Committee to interpret this definition to require recent, objective evidence 
of the existence of a condition.”201  
Even in cases where the courts have sided with the claimant, the opinions 
have noted that plan administrators could protect themselves with plan 
language that excluded coverage for subjective-proof diseases such as 
                                                                                                             
 195. Id. at *5, *7.  
 196. Id. at *6.  
 197. Id. at *10. 
 198. Id.  
 199. Meraou v. Williams Co. Long Term Disability Plan, 221 F. App’x 696, 706 (10th 
Cir. 2007).  
 200. Id. at 698 (quoting the language of the plan) (second emphasis added).  
 201. Id. at 704. 
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fibromyalgia or chronic fatigue syndrome.
202
 Though courts have espoused 
the ability of plan administrators to contract around these diseases, 
Congress could rectify the corresponding detriment to claimants.
203
 
In evaluating the restrictions and requirements in disability plans, courts 
typically distinguish the evidence that supports the diagnosis and the 
evidence that supports the disability. When a plan calls for objective 
evidence of a diagnosis, the court may find the requirement unreasonable, 
especially when confronted with a disease such fibromyalgia that has no 
objective basis for diagnosis. When the plan calls for objective evidence of 
disability, this inquiry may require the claimant to provide objective 
evidence of the limitations that the fibromyalgia or similar disease impose 
upon the claimant. Even with evidence of disability, a plan administrator 
may still deny a claimant based on lack of objective diagnosis. In that case, 
the denial is against public policy because the claimant cannot obtain such 
evidence. 
C. Subjective Proof in Other Arenas 
In contrast to adjudications involving disability denials under ERISA, 
subjective evidence is frequently used and credited in other judicial 
proceedings. Moreover, this type of evidence can be outcome determinative 
in other areas of the law.  
A jury determining an amount of damages takes into account the 
subjective evidence of the plaintiff.
204
 A jury instruction of: “Do not take 
into account plaintiff’s subjective evidence as to the amount of pain and 
suffering he or she endured as a result of the injury,” would be absurd. A 
jury cannot separate subjective evidence and pain and suffering, for they are 
inherently intertwined.  
In tort law, damages for “pain and suffering” have been a longstanding 
component of litigation.
205
 In Oklahoma, for a jury award for future pain 
and suffering based on subjective reports, “there must be evidence by 
expert witnesses that plaintiff, with reasonable certainty, will experience 
                                                                                                             
 202. See Salomaa v. Honda Long Term Disability Plan, 642 F.3d 666, 678 (9th Cir. 
2011) (“The plan has no exception to coverage for chronic fatigue syndrome, so CIGNA has 
taken on the risk of false claims for this difficult to diagnose condition.”).  
 203. See infra Section IV.C.  
 204. See Steven Plitt & John K. Wittwer, Colossus Under Attack: The Legal Efficacy of 
Computerized Evaluation of Bodily Injury Claims, 29 INS. LITIG. REP. 321, 321 (2007). 
 205. Id. 
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such pain and suffering and that the injury is permanent.”206 When “the 
injury is ‘objective, and it is plainly apparent from the nature of the 
injury . . . the jury may infer that fact from proof of that injury alone.’”207 
For example, for future pain and suffering damages due to an injury that is 
reliant on subjective evidence, the plaintiff would have to show future pain 
and suffering with expert evidence: 
Where the injury is subjective, and of such a nature that laymen 
cannot, with reasonable certainty, know whether or not there will 
be future pain and suffering, then, in order to warrant an 
instruction on that point, and to authorize a jury to return a 
verdict for future pain and suffering, there must be offered 
evidence by expert witnesses, learned in human anatomy, who 
can testify, either from a personal examination or knowledge of 
the history of the case, or from a hypothetical question based on 
the facts, that the plaintiff, with reasonable certainty, may be 
expected to experience future pain and suffering, as a result of 
the injury proven.
208
 
In claims for pain and suffering, rewards have included recovery for 
hardships such as insomnia and mental suffering.
209
 These elements, 
especially insomnia, are also symptoms of some diseases that result in 
disability claims, such as fibromyalgia.
210
 
Because of the inherently personal aspects of awards for “pain and 
suffering,” attempts to develop a formula or otherwise quantify an amount 
for a jury have failed.
211
 In Loth v. Truck-A-Way Corp., an expert informed 
the jury that, based upon his calculations, “the baseline value of an average 
person’s remaining 44-year life expectancy is $2.3 million.”212 He then told 
them “that after adjusting the baseline value to account for the plaintiff’s 
expected lifespan, the jury could calculate the plaintiff’s hedonic damages 
by multiplying the percentage of the plaintiff’s disability by the adjusted 
                                                                                                             
 206. Edwards v. Chandler, 1957 OK 45, ¶ 5, 308 P.2d 295, 297.  
 207. Id. 
 208. Reed v. Scott, 1991 OK 113, ¶ 9, 820 P.2d 445, 449 (quoting Shawnee-Tecumseh 
Traction Co. v. Griggs, 1915 OK 576, ¶ 4, 151 P. 230, 231).  
 209. STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., 2 AM. LAW OF TORTS § 8:19 (Monique C.M. Leahy, ed. 
2019).  
 210. Morgan v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 346 F.3d 1173, 1175 (8th Cir. 2003).  
 211. Loth v. Truck-A-Way Corp., 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 571, 573 (Ct. App. 1998).  
 212. Id. 
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baseline figure.”213 The court noted that “[t]here is ‘[n]o definite standard or 
method of calculation . . . prescribed by law by which to fix reasonable 
compensation for pain and suffering.’”214 
Hedonic damages, or loss of enjoyment of life, is not a separate damages 
award in all states.
215
 In Oklahoma, hedonic damages “ha[ve] not yet gained 
favor as a separate element of damages,” but “Oklahoma does allow for a 
broad sweep of evidence to be entertained in determining future pain and 
suffering.”216 The law does not require a claimant to objectively show a 
pecuniary value for pain and suffering, because in many cases, it is 
impossible.
217
 As the Oklahoma Supreme Court questioned, “Is a person 
injured in an accident to be deprived of compensation for the pain and 
suffering endured because he cannot offer evidence of what the pain and 
suffering were worth from a pecuniary standpoint?”218 
This rationale should cross over into claims for disability. Is a person 
who makes a claim for disability due to subjective disease to be deprived of 
benefits because he cannot offer objective medical proof of his disability? 
Typically, claimants who are vying for disability coverage have information 
in the administrative record from their treating physician supporting the 
claim that they are disabled.
219
 Though an administrator does not have to 
honor a personal doctor’s belief that the claimant is disabled and should be 
entitled to benefits,
220
 in a personal injury claim this evidence would allow 
the jury to award damages for future pain and suffering.
221
 
IV. Legislative and Judicial Solutions 
The problems inherent in current ERISA jurisprudence are not unknown 
to Congress. In 2010, the Senate Finance Committee held a hearing in 
which they reviewed practitioners’, doctors’, and judges’ views on the 
current state of ERISA and the discrepancies between the legislative intent 
                                                                                                             
 213. Id.  
 214. Id. at 575–76 (quoting Cal. Civil Jury Instruction 14.13 (8th ed. 1994)).  
 215. See VICKI LAWRENCE MACDOUGALL, OKLAHOMA PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW § 12:13 
(2017) (vol. 8 in Thomson Reuters’ “Oklahoma Practice Series”).  
 216. Id.  
 217. Town of Sentinel v. Boggs, 1936 OK 620, ¶ 9, 61 P.2d 654, 656–57 (per curiam).  
 218. Id.  
 219. See Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 826 (2003).  
 220. Id. at 825. 
 221. Reed v. Scott, 1991 OK 113, ¶¶ 9–11, 820 P.2d 445, 449.  
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behind that act and the current experience of policy-holders.
222
 In calling 
the hearing to order, the Senate Finance Committee Chairman 
acknowledged the “loopholes in the law” that permit insurance company 
“abuses.”223 The Chairman enumerated these loopholes as ERISA 
preemption resulting in evidentiary restrictions
224
 and the allowance of 
discretionary clauses.
225
 One testimonial described current ERISA 
jurisprudence: “Contrary to the clearly expressed legislative intent, the 
courts have transformed ERISA into a shield that protects insurance 
companies from having to face the consequences of unprincipled benefit 
denials and other breaches of fiduciary duty.”226 
Though pain determinations produce difficulty for both plan 
administrators and reviewing courts, the Social Security Administration 
(“SSA”) has solicited public input on its administrative consideration of 
pain in disability claims.
227
 The SSA aims to “remain[] aligned with 
contemporary medicine and health care delivery practices.”228 This 
determination to keep abreast of medical and scientific advances to provide 
a fairer disability claims process should be imported into ERISA. If plan 
administrators were required to evaluate subjective pain diseases in a way 
current with medical and scientific practices that emphasize the availability 
of clinical examinations, then unfair denials and judicial review would not 
be as common or complicated. However, as the SSA’s call for notes and 
comments is still so recent, any implementation of the SSA’s findings is 
unlikely to occur soon.
229
  
While a scientific solution for pain evaluation may be on the horizon, 
there is no telling how long such a solution will take to find and implement 
in disability claims and administrator evaluations. For now, having a 
                                                                                                             
 222. Do Private Long-Term Disability Policies Provide the Protection They Promise?: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 111th Cong. (2010) [hereinafter Hearing].  
 223. Id. at 2 (statement of Sen. Max Baucus, Chairman, S. Comm. on Fin.). 
 224. The Congressman listed the following evidentiary restrictions: “[C]laimants cannot 
get jury trials, pretrial discovery, or the right to submit evidence to the court.” Id. (statement 
of Sen. Max Baucus, Chairman, S. Comm. on Fin.). 
 225. Id. (statement of Sen. Max Baucus, Chairman, S. Comm. on Fin.). 
 226. Id. at 5 (statement of Mark DeBofsky, Att’y, Daley, DeBofsky, and Bryant, Chi., 
Ill.).  
 227. Consideration of Pain in the Disability Determination Process, 83 Fed. Reg. 64493-
01 (proposed for comment Dec. 17, 2018). 
 228. Id.  
 229. The deadline for public comments and supporting data about pain evaluation was 
due February 15, 2019. Id. 
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judicial safeguard that ensures claimants are not being denied unfairly will 
ensure that ERISA’s primary goal of protecting beneficiaries’ interests is 
given full strength. 
A. Heightened “Abuse of Discretion” Standard 
A universal standard of review for appeals of ERISA denials would 
allow for more clarity and consistency among ERISA appeals.
230
 Though 
the Supreme Court in MetLife refused to enlist a “talismanic” set of factors 
to be considered by courts, a “list of nonexclusive factors” would guide 
lower courts and help ERISA’s goal of creating “uniformity in the field of 
employee benefits.”231 One factor that should be included in this list is 
whether the denial of benefits was based on a lack of objective evidence or 
tests. Even if there is not a universal list of factors that lower courts must 
take into account when reviewing denials of benefits, circuits should 
elucidate that a lessening of deference is warranted where a plan 
administrator bases the denial upon lack of objective proof of disease. 
When faced with an appeal for a denial of disability benefits for a claimant 
with a subjective-proof disease, the reviewing court should heighten the 
abuse of discretion standard. This solution mirrors that proposed by the 
Supreme Court in Firestone for the conflict of interest the insurer has when 
acting as both plan administrator and payor of benefits.  
When outlining the factors for reviewing courts to consider in analyzing 
a denial for benefits, the courts should consider the presentation of 
subjective proof as a factor, sliding the scale against the deferential standard 
usually implemented by appellate courts.
232
 The benefits of a heightened 
standard of review for claims that are based on subjective evidence include 
better protection for claimants from discriminatory denials and improved 
guidance for courts in reviewing claims of this nature. Acknowledging that 
the medical community cannot objectively prove these diseases, and that 
plan administrators are taking advantage of that ambiguity will ensure that 
claimants are not unfairly denied. Though this solution still grants 
deference to the plan administrator, allowing the fact that a claimant’s 
diagnosis is based on subjective proof to lower that deference makes it 
more likely that a claimant will get a full and fair review.  
One major drawback of heightening the abuse of discretion standard is 
the potential for judicial confusion regarding the standard of review. With 
                                                                                                             
 230. See Stevenson, supra note 10, at 134–45. 
 231. Id.  
 232. See Weber v. GE Grp. Life Assurance Co., 541 F.3d 1002, 1010 (10th Cir. 2008).  
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the Supreme Court’s decision in Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Glenn, the 
Court solidified that the plan administrator’s position as both decision-
maker and payor of benefits is a conflict of interest.
233
 Further, the decision 
explicated that the conflict of interest is to be taken into account in ERISA 
appeals.
234
 The circuits implemented this heightened scrutiny, with some 
using a sliding scale approach and others essentially leaving the abuse of 
discretion standard the same.
235
 Adding one more factor to a non-exhaustive 
list of considerations may create judicial confusion, as judicial ERISA 
reviews have no universal template. Though circuit courts are unlikely to 
reach unanimity in evaluating subjective-proof diseases, elucidating the 
subjective-proof concern as a specific factor would ensure that claimants 
with these diseases are not unfairly barred by a judicial framework that does 
not ensure claimants have a fair chance at overturning a denial.  
B. De Novo Review 
The Supreme Court has been wary of instituting de novo review for 
benefit claim denial appeals.
236
 Though the Supreme Court has not been 
willing to expressly adopt a system of de novo review for denials of claim 
benefits under ERISA, Congress could implement legislation establishing 
this level of review to better protect claimants.
237
 Such an implementation 
would ensure that claimants are properly heard in court and that claimants 
receive a full and fair review of the benefit denial. This change would not 
only aid claimants suffering from subjective-proof diseases, but also protect 
those who make claims for objectively diagnosed diseases. Instead of an 
interested plan administrator, the appeal would be decided by an 
uninterested third party, thus giving the claimant the best chance for a fair 
decision. De novo review could also encourage expanded discovery, which 
would allow claimants to present evidence outside of the administrative 
record for review. Enabling courts to look at more evidence would fully 
effectuate the allowance of full and fair review under ERISA.  
Though appealing to claimants, de novo review of all ERISA claim 
denials is unlikely because of the immense judicial expense it would 
                                                                                                             
 233. 554 U.S. 105, 114 (2008).  
 234. Id. at 117. 
 235. See Stevenson, supra note 10, at 114–32.  
 236. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115–17 (1989). 
 237. Glenn, 554 U.S. at 114 (“Had Congress intended such a system of review, we 
believe it would not have left to the courts the development of review standards but would 
have said more on the subject.”).  
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require.
238
 It would also deny the insurer the benefit of the discretions that it 
bargained for in the insurance contract.
239
 The increased litigation expenses 
would likely be passed through to the employers using the plans, thus 
decreasing the appeal of providing these benefits for employees. If plan 
administrators were not allowed this discretion, the added cost for 
employers might cause them to abandon their plans altogether.
240
 Though 
potentially more costly, the legislature drafted ERISA to provide for de 
novo review, and only subsequent judicial interpretation of that Act has 
given insurance companies discretion.
241
 
Since universal de novo review for ERISA denials is unlikely, whether 
by Supreme Court ruling or legislative intervention, other, more narrow 
alternatives would still protect claimants whose diseases have unknown 
etiology or use subjective proof. Courts should alter the standard of review 
when plan administrators deny benefits for reasons involving subjective 
evidence. These decisions should be evaluated de novo, without the 
deference normally given to plan administrators. Courts could review the 
factual contentions and independently determine if the claimant is entitled 
to disability benefits.  
Even in cases where the court has overturned a denial of benefits for an 
abuse of discretion, the weighing of conflicts of interest is a difficult 
judicial task.
242
 For example, “unlike weighing potassium bromide and 
                                                                                                             
 238. See Hearing, supra note 222, at 11–12 (“[B]usiness owners would be disinclined to 
provide voluntary benefits if it becomes overly expensive or it exposes the business to the 
threat of costly litigation.”) (statement of Paul Graham, Senior Vice President, Ins. Reg., and 
Chief Actuary, Am. Council of Life Insurers, Wash., D.C.).  
 239. Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1563 (11th Cir. 
1990) (“While de novo review is an attractive avenue for controlling the exercise of 
discretion contrary to the interests of the beneficiaries, the application of this strict standard 
would deny Blue Cross the benefit of the bargain it made in the insurance contract.”).  
 240. But see Hearing, supra note 222, at 6 (statement of Mark DeBofsky, Att’y, Daley, 
DeBofsky, and Bryant, Chi., Ill.). DeBofsky argues that the value of providing employee 
benefit plans “to recruit and retain prized employees” is outweighed by any increased cost. 
Id. (statement of Mark DeBofsky, Att’y, Daley, DeBofsky, and Bryant, Chi., Ill.). He 
predicts that “it is extremely unlikely that employers would cease sponsoring benefit plans, 
nor is there a legitimate fear of markedly increased costs.” Id. (statement of Mark DeBofsky, 
Att’y, Daley, DeBofsky, and Bryant, Chi., Ill.). 
 241. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2014); see also Hearing, supra note 222, at 8 (“The 
clear language of ERISA recognizes nothing less than a trial on the merits.”) (statement by 
Hon. William M. Acker, Jr., Senior U.S. Dist. Court Judge, N.D. Ala., Birmingham, Ala.).  
 242. See Salomaa v. Honda Long Term Disability Plan, 642 F.3d 666, 675 (9th Cir. 
2011).  
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potassium ferricyanide in a traditional darkroom, [a court’s] ‘weighing’ is 
done without a scale, without the little brass weights, and without a 
substance to weigh that has any weighable mass.”243 This difficulty would 
be ameliorated by adjusting the standard of review when plan 
administrators deny a claim due to a lack of objective evidence. Instead of 
wading into the bog of evaluating conflicts of interest, the court could 
simply review the underlying claim de novo and determine if the claimant 
is entitled to disability benefits. 
Currently, judicial review is limited to review of the administrative 
record because of the discretion granted to plan administrators. This scope 
limitation means that the claimant is not able to present further evidence to 
the court to attempt to prove disability or show that the plan administrator 
wrongfully denied disability benefits. Though de novo review does not 
automatically guarantee the claimant’s ability to provide further evidence, 
an alteration to the current judicial process to allow evidence outside of the 
administrative record could ensure that the policy goals of ERISA are 
upheld. If a reviewing court can examine this evidence de novo and 
determine if the claimant is entitled to benefits, then there is the greatest 
surety of “full and fair” review, which is guaranteed under ERISA. Further, 
when a plan administrator denies a claim for disability because the claimant 
brings forth subjective evidence, the courts should consider the denial an 
automatic abuse of discretion. Courts should require that a plan 
administrator have more reason to deny a claimant than just the fact that she 
brings forward only subjective evidence.
244
  
Though the Supreme Court has been reluctant to permit de novo review 
in these types of claims, such an approach would ensure that claimants 
receive a full and fair review. Because plan administrators act under a 
conflict of interest, diseases evidenced by subjective proof present an easy 
and mildly persuasive justification for denying claims. Therefore, courts 
should pursue heightened standards of review in order to give 
disadvantaged, pain-filled claimants the protection they need.  
  
                                                                                                             
 243. Id.  
 244. See id. at 676 (finding plan administrator’s denial was unreasonable because “the 
plan administrator demanded objective tests to establish the existence of a condition for 
which there are not objective tests” among other factors).  
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C. Disallowance of “Self-Report” Clauses in Long-Term Disability Plans 
Today, many private LTD plans limit benefits for diseases that rely on 
subjective-proof or self-reported symptoms.
245
 For example, a plan may 
state that plan benefits will be terminated after twenty-four months for 
diseases “not verifiable using tests, procedures or clinical examinations 
standardly accepted in the practice of medicine.”246 This plan language is 
hard to reconcile with the current state of medicine regarding subjective-
proof diseases.
247
 With many very real, very debilitating diseases, there are 
not objective medical tests available to prove the existence of some 
conditions. When an LTD plan includes a clause that explicitly denies 
benefits to a class of claimants with disabling diseases that are unprovable, 
the plan impedes the basic purpose of ERISA.  
Requiring objective proof of the etiology of a disease or discontinuing 
benefits because a claimant’s complaints are self-reported fails to provide 
adequate protection. There are medical evaluations that can provide 
evidence of disability where a disease is not objectively measurable.
248
 
With the availability of these tests to determine whether a disease renders a 
claimant disabled, there is not a need for objective proof of the disease. If 
Congress disallowed the use of self-report provisions, then claimants with 
subjective-proof diseases would have the same benefits and review process 
as other more objectively verifiable diseases. If denied, the proper district 
court could then review the claim without the bias against self-reported 
symptoms.  
Since the Supreme Court has found that trust law largely governs 
ERISA, plan administrators are acting as fiduciaries.
249
 As such, they must 
“discharge [their] duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the 
[plan] participants and beneficiaries.”250 This duty is hard to reconcile with 
                                                                                                             
 245. See, e.g., Weitzenkamp v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 500 F. App’x 506, 507 (7th 
Cir. 2013); Cox v. Allin Corp. Plan, 70 F. Supp. 3d 1040, 1043 (N.D. Cal. 2014). The plan at 
issue in Weitzenkamp contained a clause that ceased benefits after two years for disabilities 
“which are primarily based on self-reported symptoms.” Weitzenkamp, 500 F. App’x at 507 
(quoting language of the plan). The plan defined self-reported symptoms as “those that ‘are 
not verifiable using tests, procedures or clinical examinations.’” Id. (quoting the language of 
the plan).  
 246. Cox, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 1043 (quoting the language of the plan).  
 247. See supra Part III.  
 248. See Liebel v. AETNA Life Ins. Co., 595 F. App’x 755, 759–61 (10th Cir. 2014). 
 249. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110–11 (1989).  
 250. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2012).  
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contract language that denies relief for a certain class of diseases. If 
Congress required disability plans to cover self-reported symptoms, then an 
entire class of disability claimants would be better able to obtain the full 
and fair review that ERISA promises. 
Conclusion 
Diseases evidenced by subjective proof are inherently impossible to 
prove objectively, and therefore are difficult to address on judicial review. 
The standard of review that courts employ in these appeals is that of “abuse 
of discretion,” which is heightened if there is a conflict of interest, which 
there often is. This conflict of interest arises because the insurer is both the 
administrator of the plan and the payor of benefits if the claimant succeeds 
in their application. Even with a heightened “abuse of discretion” standard, 
claimants whose diseases are evidenced by subjective proof are not 
guaranteed a full and fair review of their claims. Plan administrators may 
simply deny claims and then argue that the denial was justified due to a lack 
of objective evidence on appeal. While they are not always successful, with 
today’s judicial scheme, it is more likely than not that the plan 
administrator’s denial will be upheld.  
Increasingly, insurance plan language discriminates against claimants 
with subjective-proof diseases. “Self-Report” clauses and those that deny 
any form of relief for these illnesses are against public policy and should be 
disallowed by federal legislation. To provide that an employee must have 
objective evidence of his disease contradicts modern medicine’s recognition 
of many debilitating diseases that do not have medical tests for diagnosis. If 
an employee is provided coverage by his employer or buys long-term 
disability coverage independently, plan administrators should not deny his 
claim because his plan has unfairly excluded his disease. These self-report 
clauses are against public policy and Congress should mandate an exclusion 
from long-term disability plans covered under ERISA. ERISA’s goal to 
protect the rights of employees goes against the coverage provided in many 
of these plans, and these contradictions should not be allowed. 
By altering the standard of review or disallowing clauses biased against 
subjective-proof diseases, a claimant’s right to full and fair review will be 
ensured. Just because objective tests do not evidence these diseases does 
not mean they are any less disabling. Ensuring a claimant receives full and 
fair review guarantees that the employee’s rights are upheld and plan 
administrators do not unfairly deny their claims.  
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